In this paper we report the results from a survey among all publicly listed Nordic firms on their policy decisions concerning their capital structure. We find that more than 60 percent of the companies have a rather or relatively flexible debt target, whether a strict target or no target, and find support for both firm characteristics as well as behavioral variables. We also study the link between capital structure policy and dividend policy, and find that dividend-paying firms as well as firms which state that they have a definite dividend policy are more likely to also have a stricter debt target. These results indicate that more research should be done on the joint setting of capital structure and dividend policies.
Introduction
A dominating strand in research concerning corporate capital structures has been the study of the determinants of an implicit optimal capital structure, and the speed of the adjustment towards such a target (see, e.g., Frank and Goyal (2009), Faulkender et al. (2012) , and McMillan and Camara (2012) ). As such, many of the empirical studies have been aimed at providing support for a particular theory of capital structure; such as the trade-off theory with taxation and bankruptcy costs, or the pecking-order theory. The results indicate that companies seem to aim towards some target, but are slow to change their capital structure for various reasons. Frank and Goyal (2009) identify six core factors which seem to get consistent signs and significance in explaining the variation in market-based leverage ratios 1 .
More recently, the existence of a target leverage ratio has been questioned in studies providing support for a path dependent capital structure, generated e.g. as the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market (e.g. Baker and Wurgler (2002) , Welch (2004) , and Hennessy and Whited (2005) ). A few papers have also looked at behavioral determinants of leverage decisions (Barros and Silveira (2007) , Frank and Goyal (2007) ). However, there are only few papers (e.g., Graham and Harvey (2001) ) that ask the company directly whether or not they have a target capital structure, and how strict it is.
In this study, we utilize a comprehensive survey of Nordic firms to study factors affecting capital structure decisions, and contribute by studying the determinants for the strictness of a capital structure target. We also contribute by analyzing how managerial factors may affect the firm's policy choices. We study both the role of the Chairman's age on the strictness of the capital structure target, as well as the link between a defined dividend policy and the strictness of the capital structure target. Such a link may e.g. be seen as an example of "managerial fixed effects" if more control ori-ented managers tend to introduce more formal policies for both of them. Finally, we investigate determinants of more complex financial policies: the choice between short and long term debt, issuing seasoned equity and convertible debt. Our results are based on a survey conducted among the Chairmen (CMs) and the financial managers (CFOs) of the companies listed on the Nordic stock exchanges. The results are combined with financial data on the actual characteristics and performance of the firms, and behavioral data on the respondent (age).
We find that more than 60 percent of the companies have a relatively flexible debt target, whereas a strict target or no target at all is approximately equally common among the rest of the companies. When studying the determinants of the strictness of the capital structure target, we find support for both firm characteristics such as profitability and solidity, but also for variables of a more behavioral nature: the Chairman's age, and firm age. We also find support for the joint setting of capital structure and dividend policies in line with Faulkender, Milbourn and Thakor (2006) . A stricter capital structure policy is more likely in dividend paying firms as well as in firms which according to the questionnaire responses have formulated a definite dividend policy.
In addition, we study the self-proclaimed importance of alternative explanations for the respondents' choice for the appropriate level of debt as well as the choice between long-term and shortterm debt, convertible debt vs. straight debt and the decision to issue new equity. Our results show in line with Graham and Harvey (2001) that longterm debt is used over short-term debt mostly as a hedge against the possibility of facing insufficient funds. In contrast to Graham and Harvey (2001) US findings, however, debt rating considerations clearly plays a less important role for Nordic firms. We conjecture that this result simply reflects the more predominant use of non-rated debt financing such as bank debt. Tor Brunzell, Eva Liljeblom, Anders Löflund and Mika Vaihekoski We document relatively high willingness to issue equity (35.5%) or convertible debt (20.8%). Consistent with Graham and Harvey (2001) firms carefully consider earnings per share dilution. Access to alternative sources of funds before undertaking a stock issue was found to be relatively more important than in the Graham and Harvey (2001) sample. Taxation or industry level debt-ratio benchmarking were not found to drive leverage choices. Interestingly, convertibles were seen as a source of cheaper debt (compared to straight debt) and as causing less earnings dilution than seasoned equity offerings.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The testable hypotheses are developed in the second section. The sample and survey method are discussed in section three. In section four we present the results together with discussion of their implications. The final section offers conclusions and some suggestions for further research.
Literature review and hypothesis development
Early research on optimal capital structure focused on the development of a model for optimal leverage. More recent research has studied the choice of the target, whether firms adjust towards this optimum and what is the speed of adjustment. Results have shown that the costs of leverage and adjustment play a major role in setting the target leverage as well as the speed of adjustment towards this target (Faulkender et al. (2012) ). Berk, Stanton and Zechner (2010) suggest that the debt target is related e.g. to management compensation. Other studies have found that the leverage level is associated with firm's size and profitability, corporate tax rate, agency costs, expected inflation, and the tangibility of firm's assets (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Frank and Goyal (2009) ). In addition, the timing of the market affects the decisions (see Baker and Wurgler (2002) , Hennessy and Whited (2005) ), even to the extent that one can question the existence of an actual target capital structure. On the other hand, Kayhan and Titman (2007) not only report evidence on links between the capital structure and external capital raised, but also find that over long horizons, such effects are partially reversed, and capital structures tend to move towards target debt ratios consistent with the tradeoff theories of capital structure. Despite the focus on the question of the existence of a target debt ratio, relatively few studies have looked at the strictness of such a ratio. Graham and Harvey (2001) is one the exceptions. They report that 19% of their respondents (CFOs) declined following a target debt ratio, 37% indicated having a flexible target, 34% a somewhat stricter target, while the remaining 10% committed to a strict target debt ratio. Large firms were more likely to have target debt ratios, while targets were stricter among investment-grade and regulated firms. In this paper, we contribute to the general question concerning the existence of a target capital structure by reporting survey results for Nordic listed firms concerning the strictness of their target leverage ratio.
We will also contribute by studying the determinants of a target capital structure. We are especially interested in two sub-questions concerning such determinants: the question of managerial effects, and the links to a defined dividend policy.
Our first sub-question relates to the interesting line of studies looking at managerial effects on leverage decisions. Frank and Goyal (2007) study the effect of top managers on corporate financial decisions. They find that differences among CEOs account for a great deal of variation in leverage among firms, as exemplified by a strong fixed effect associated with the CEO in a leverage regression. They also find that CEO incentives are associated with leverage adjustment speeds, and that when a CEO leaves, leverage typically drops. Also some CEO characteristics seem to be associated with leverage. Most notable is the negative relationship between CEO tenure and leverage. Although some such characteristics are significant, the authors note that they do not account for all that much of the variation in the data. The CFO also seems to be playing an important role. Also Barros and Silveira (2007) provide evidence of managerial fixed effects on corporate policies in Brazil, especially on the link between manager changes and variations in capital structures. On the other hand, Graham and Harvey (2001) found that targets were considered as important when the CEO had a short tenure or was young.
A lower leverage ratio in firms with an older manager would be in line with "behavioral consistency theory" 2 , which suggests that an individual behaves in a consistent manner across different comparable situations. Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012) find support for the behavioral consistency in the form of a match between the personal leverage choices of CEOs, and their firms. If managers become more risk averse with age, as suggested e.g. by the results of Morin and Suarez (1983) , and if they can influence the leverage decisions of the firm, a negative relationship between manager age and leverage level might be expected. Managerial risk aversion is also likely to play a role if costs associated with readjustments of optimal leverage ratio disproportionally affect managers personally, as is often the case in large scale cost cutting programs involving layoffs and asset sales or liquidations. Risk averse managers are therefore also more likely to minimize disutility arising from painful down-sizing by controlling excessive leverage ex ante by the means of a stricter capital structure target, since the alternative (a flexible debt policy) would require a willingness to allow significant increases in the debt ratio in times of financial distress. Such temporarily high leverage ratios may cause disutility especially for older CEOs as the high leverage state may persist over their remaining tenure. Thus, we hypothesize that older CEOs, due to a higher risk aversion, prefer strict low-debt ratio policies to flexible low-debt policies since they minimize the (personal) total costs of financial distress for the managers. Debt policy strictness does require operative efficiency and careful liquidity maintenance but these costs appear in small doses over time rather than full scale layoffs and restructuring decision. The strict low-debt ratio policy thus minimizes costs in both dimensions for the seasoned manager. For these reasons, in gauging the determinants for debt policy strictness, it is important to separate out the effect of the level of leverage, which we do.
Our data includes questionnaire results concerning the firm's policy, answered by the Chairman of the board. A positive association between strictness of debt policy and age of the board Chairman is therefore consistent with a managerial risk aversion effect. Our first specific hypothesis of interest is thus: H1: Companies with an older Chairman of the board are more likely to have a stricter target capital structure.
Our second sub-question deals with the combined existence of a dividend and a capital structure policy. To our knowledge, there are few studies looking at such links. Faulkender, Milbourn, and Thakor (2006) present an integrated theory for the capital structure and dividend policy choices, where they find both of these determined as implicit governance mechanisms. They also generate testable predictions from the theory and test them, obtaining strong support for the integrated approach i.e. that the two policies are jointly determined. However, between firms, different combinations of capital structure and dividend targets may be optimal.
We argue in the spirit of Faulkender, Milbourn, and Thakor (2006) that shareholders want to minimize total agency costs through carefully coordinated dividend and debt policies. Commitment to an explicit (minimum) dividend payout policy helps reduce managerial agency costs by constraining the amount of free cash flow at the discretion of managers. Adopting a higher target debt ratio (above the level dictated by trade-offtheory) has a similar effect. On the other hand, setting the target debt ratio too high increases costs of debt due to increased expected bankruptcy costs. However, a higher target debt ratio increases agency costs of debt due to increased expected bankruptcy costs. Creditors typically protect themselves by imposing solidity requirements e.g. through EBITDA-to-debt-ratio and dividend payout controls, constraining the firms' use of dividend policy to reduce managerial agency costs. Hence, firms committed to a strict debt policy may face difficulties in complying with a minimum target dividend. Would it then not be optimal for firms to choose a flexible debt policy? Not necessarily, because a strict target leverage policy signals lower agency costs of debt through the firm's commitment to cutting costs / selling assets upon income shocks in order to restore the chosen leverage ratio. A joint optimization of dividend and debt policies may thus be required in order to minimize total agency costs. We expect a positive relation between the existence of a firm's dividend policy and the strictness of its debt policy.
H2: Companies with a defined dividend policy are more likely to have a stricter debt-to-equity / capital structure target.
Data

The survey data
This paper is based on the data collected as part of a research project in which a broad questionnaire was directed to Chairmen of the Board, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) as well as Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) of all publicly listed firms in the Nordic countries (i.e., Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). Different questionnaires were sent to the three respondent groups, although the questionnaires shared some common questions. Here we utilize the responses concerning the capital structure; such questions were only posed to the Chairmen (concerning firm policies) and the CFOs (concerning practical implementation). 3 The reason for the choice of Chairman as the respondent on policy questions (as opposed to the CEO) is that the overall policy choices are typically made in the firm's Board of Directors. It is the firm's Board which suggests the dividend to the Annual Shareholders Meeting, and also sets the main KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) for the management, among which a leverage target may well be included. We feel that the Chairman is therefore the best person to answer questions concerning whether the firm has or has not a strict target capital structure. Since it above all is the CFO who implements the capital structure decisions, the questions of a more practical nature (such as which factors affect capital issuance decisions) were directed to the CFO. Appendix 1 of this paper lists the questions from the questionnaire which are analyzed in this study, and to whom they were directed to.
The survey was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, after the questionnaire design had been completed 4 , the questionnaire was sent to the respondents in the Nordic firms listed on the exchanges operated by the OMX (now NASDAQ OMX), i.e. in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. This took place in early December 2007. In the second stage, in May 2008, the questionnaire was also sent to the respondents in the firms listed at the Oslo Børs in Norway. The questionnaire was sent as a letter directed to a named respondent. The names and addresses of the respondents (i.e. the Chairmen of the Board and the CFOs) were hand-collected into a database. As a result, the questionnaire was sent to 780 Chair men and 711 CFOs. The number of CFOs was smaller as some of the firms were lacking a specific CFO.
The respondents were promised total anonymity i.e. the responses and the respondent's identity is only available to the researchers and the results are reported only as a group. Table 1 reports the response rates across countries and respondent groups. The overall response rate among the Chairmen and CFOs was 21.1%, ranging from 11.2%
for Norway to 30.0% for Sweden.5 The CFOs were in relative terms more active respondents (22.1% vs 20.3%), but due to the differences in population sizes, the overall number of responses was almost the same for both categories of respondents (158 for the Chairmen, 157 for the CFOs).
Background data
The responses were matched with background information on firm financials. The financial data is collected from three sources. Our primary source is the Amadeus database which is augmented with additional items from Datastream, when the information was not available in Amadeus. Finally, annual reports downloaded from the web have provided an additional data source in cases where information has not been available in other databases. The financials are from the last reporting year completed prior to the questionnaire was sent out, i.e. they are mainly from the year-end 2006 for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden, and from 2007 for Norway. Year-end exchange rates have been used to convert all financial items to the same currency, euro. Financial data was collected not only for responding firms, but also for the whole market, to facilitate relating our sample to the whole population of the survey. Table 2 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for firms from which either the Chairman or the CFO or both answered and for the whole population. Statistics are provided separately for financial and non-financial firms. 6 Table 2 Panel A shows that our firms are marginally larger than the population of firms to which the questionnaire was sent. This holds both for the non-financial firms (223 in our sample) as well as for the financial firms (48 firms in the sam- 
Results
The determinants of the strictness of the capital structure target
We asked the Chairmen (CM) whether the company has a target range for the debt (to equity) ratio. Four alternatives were given: 'no target range', 'flexible target range', 'somewhat tight TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics for responding firms and the target population Panel A lists descriptive statistics for the listed firms in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden that were targeted in the survey (the "Population", 780 firms), as well as for the responding firms (the "Sample", 271 firms) from which we received a filled-in questionnaire from either the Chairman (CM) or the CFO or both. The firms are divided into Financials (banks, investment and insurance companies) and Non-financials based on the sector codes used by the OMX exchanges and Oslo Børs. We report averages, medians, standard deviations, and the number of firms for which the financial information item has been obtained ("Obs") for the following variables: Turnover (in 1000s of euros), number of employees, total assets (in 1000s of euros), return on total assets (ROA, defined as Net Profit to Total Assets), and solidity (Equity to Total Assets). Panel B lists descriptive statistics for additional non-survey based variables for the CM sample, utilized as such or in logarithmic form later in Table 3 . Out of the 158 responses from the CMs, thirteen did not answer this question. Out of the 145 answers, 28 (19.3%) companies indicated that they do not have a target debt ratio. Most of the companies (80.7%) have a target range for their debt ratio, where 39 (26.9%) have a flexible target ratio, 49 (33.8%) have rather flexible target ratio, and 29 (20.0%) have a strict target debt ratio. Analyzing TABLE 3. Target range for debt ratio Chairmen were first asked whether the company has a target range for the debt ratio. Four alternatives were given (no target, flexible target, somewhat flexible target, strict target). Then they were asked to indicate the degree to which the given factors contribute to the debt target. CFOs were also asked the same question. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). Panel A reports the results about the existence of the policy. Panels B and C report the respondents' opinions on the given set of factors influencing the debt level. Results are given first for the Chairmen, then for the CFOs. N and Nempty are the total number of respondents with non-empty or empty reply, respectively. (2001) found. In their sample of US firms, 19% of the firms did not have a target debt ratio, whereas 81% do. However, they found that only 10% (vs. our 20.0%) of the firms have a very strict target, and 37% had flexible and 34% rather flexible target (range). In order to test for the determinants for the strictness of the target capital structure, and to test our two specific hypothesis, we estimate an ordered probit model where the dependent variable, Strict_cap_struct, gets a value from one to four depending on the strictness of the target range for the debt levels. As explanatory variables in the base-case, we include financial control variables also familiar from prior studies of the determinants for leverage levels (Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Baker and Wurgler (2002) ).
N NO TARGET FLEXIBLE MEDIUM STRICT PANEL A: TARGET RANGE FOR DEBT RATIO
First, we include profitability, size and solidity. Profitability is measured as the return on total assets, ROA. More profitable firms have higher degrees of freedom for the choice between how much to leave in the firm (how much to invest) and how much to pay out, and may also have higher agency costs due to higher free cash flows. They may therefore need to solve the agency problem by more explicit policies for capital structure and payout (including e.g. an upper limit for equity-to-assets). We expect a positive sign for ROA. Size in turn is measured by the logarithm of annual turnover, ln(turnover). We expect a negative sign for size, since larger firms have a better access to capital market and may therefore have a smaller need for strict capital structure targets. Solidity is measured as equity to total assets. We expect that the debt target is stricter in more leveraged firms, due to creditor control and thereby induced incentives to restrict agency costs of debt. This is in line with the results in Graham and Harvey (2001) , where the respondents (CFOs) told that the companies may issue equity to maintain a target debt-equity ratio especially if the firm is highly levered.
We also include Market-to-book, measured as the market value of equity over its book value, and Past_12m_sales_growth, measured as the change in sales between those reported in the last annual report and the report before that. In empirical leverage regressions, both of these have been found to correlate negatively with leverage (see e.g. Baker and Wurgler (2002) ). However, for our model for the strictness of the capital structure target, we do not have explicit expectations for these. We also include the logarithm of the age of the firm, ln_firm_age. We expect that stricter capital structure targets have been more in need in times with less developed capital markets. By the inclusion of firm age we want to test whether these is a tradition in older firms for fixing stronger targets.
Finally, we include our main variables of interest, ln_CM_age, the logarithm of the age of the Chairman of the board at the time of the survey (i.e. the respondent to the survey questions on capital structure and dividend policy), and Div_ policy_dummy, a survey variable taking the value of one if the Chairman has indicated that the firm has a defined dividend policy. With the inclusion of Div_pay we test whether capital structure policies are more or less common in dividend paying firms. Table 2 Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the additional non-survey related variables (in addition to those in Panel A of Table 2 ) used in our estimation.7
The tested model is an ordered probit model (estimated using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors) of the following type:
where FIRM_CHAR i is a vector of firm (i) variables including ROA, ln(turnover), Solidity, Marketto-book, Past_12m_sales _growth, and ln_firm_age. DIV_POLICY i is a vector including Div_policy_ dummy, a dummy taking the value of one if the respondent has indicated that firm i has a defined dividend policy, and zero otherwise, and Div_pay, a dummy taking the value of one if firm i paid a dividend during any of the years around the questionnaire (2006 to 2008) , and zero ot-TABLE 4. Debt ratio target range strictness Results from an ordered probit model are reported, where the ordinary dependent variable Strict_cap_struct can have values from zero to three (0 = no target value for debt/equity ratio, 1 = flexible target, 2 = somewhat tight target range, and 3 = strict target range). The explanatory variables are: Net profit over total assets (ROA), the natural logarithm of turnover (ln(turnover)), equity to total assets (Solidity), market value of equity over book value of equity (Market-to-book), the percentage change in annual sales between last two years (Past_12m_sales_growth), the logarithm of firm age (ln_firm_age), the logarithm of the age of the Chairman of the board (ln_CM_age), a dummy for firms paying dividends around the survey (Div_pay), and a dummy for firms indicating in the survey that they have a definite dividend policy (Div_ policy_dummy). Country dummies for Denmark, Norway and Sweden as well as for manufacturing and financial firms are included. Robust standard errors are used to calculate z-values (provided below the parameter estimates). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, one-sided tests. The Wald χ 2 and the Pseudo-R 2 are also reported. Table 4 . Model I in Table 4 reports the results from a basic model with only the three main corporate control variables for which we have a clear Tor Brunzell, Eva Liljeblom, Anders Löflund and Mika Vaihekoski expectation (ROA, ln(turnover) , and Solidity). The behavioral variables of ln_firm_age and ln_CM_age are also included. We obtain expected signs for all of these, and all but size, are significant at least at the 10% level. Model II also includes the remaining firm characteristics, i.e. Market-to-book and Past_12m_sales_growth. They obtain positive signs but are not significant in this specification. Next, we also include Div_pay (in Model III), and Div_pol-icy_dummy, the survey variable (in Model IV). 9 We find that the dummy for a defined dividend policy obtains a positive sign as expected, and is highly significant. Robustness tests reveal that it is significant in all specifications where included. In Model IV, also ln(turnover) is significant at the 10% level.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
We performed additional robustness tests of the models in Table 4 . When the model is estimated only for the non-financial firms, the significance of some of the corporate characteristics decline, but both ln_CM_age as well as Div_pol-icy_dummy remain highly significant. However, also ROA and Solidity are significant also e.g. in Model I specification without financials. In the Graham and Harvey (2001) study, the respondents (CFOs) told that the companies may issue equity to maintain a target debt-equity ratio especially if ownership is dispersed. In additional robustness tests, our variables for ownership concentration (the percentage of equity owned by the five largest owners, or alternatively, a dummy for cases when the cumulative ownership of the five largest owners exceeds 20%), were insignificant with positive coefficient estimates, not supporting the result in Graham and Harvey (2001) .
In this subsection, we reported the results from our survey concerning the responses to the question on the strictness of the firms' capital structure target, and performed tests of the determinants of policy strictness. We find that a stricter target capital structure is more common in profitable, and in leveraged firms. The latter is in contrast to Graham and Harvey (2001) who find no difference between the score for financial flexibility in firms with high 9 The correlation between these two dividend variables is high (0.49), and hence they are not included in the same model. or low debt ratio. A simple interpretation may be that these are cases where the specification of either a maximum level for equity-to-assets, or a minimum one, may be required from owners (due to agency costs associated with free cash flow), or creditors, respectively. We also find support for managerial effects: a stricter capital structure target is more common if the Chairman is older. This finding is in line with managerial risk aversion affecting the choice of debt policy strictness. It is in contrast with Graham and Harvey (2001) who find no significant difference between financial flexibility scores between firms with younger or mature CEOs (the same conclusion holds for most other GH scores capturing aspects of debt policy strictness).
We also find that a stricter policy is more common in older firms, a finding that perhaps may also be addressed to behavioral / traditional reasons. Finally, we find that a stricter capital structure policy goes hand in hand with a dividend policy. Both the dummy for a dividend paying firm, as well as the response variable from the questionnaire, confirming the existence of a definite dividend policy, obtain significance in explaining the strictness of the capital structure target. The fact, that dividend policy variables retain their significance to debt policy strictness even in the presence of a leverage (level) control, supports the notion that dividend and debt policies often need to be coordinated jointly.
The level of the capital structure target
We also asked both the CFOs and Chairmen to evaluate the importance of several alternative explanations to the selection of the appropriate level of debt for the company. A scale from one (not important) to five (highly important) was given for each explanation. Table 5 show the results, first for CM (Panel B) and then for CFOs (Panel C). The results show in line with Graham and Harvey (2001) that both CM and CFOs consider the financial flexibility and operational financing as the most important factors in deciding the appropriate amount of debt for the company. The volatility of the earnings (cash flows) was third important aspect for both. On the other end, both respondent groups agreed that debt levels are not set to use it as way of avoiding the threat of being a target for a takeover nor for tax reasons.
Overall, our results here are quite consistent with Graham and Harvey (2001) who document that financial flexibility, credit play role, earnings/ cash flow volatility and insufficient internal funds (in our case "operational financing") are the four most important determinants of debt policy.
Short-term vs. long term debt
We asked the CFOs what factors affect their company's choice between short and long-term debt. Five different potential reasons were given. Respondents were asked to evaluate each reason on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). The results are provided in Table 5 .
The most important factor is clearly the use of long term debt to minimize risk of financial risk (mean answer 3.47) which we interpret as meaning securing access to funds and locking in the cost of debt for a longer time thorough issuing fixed rate bonds. It is followed by the hope of matching the maturity of debt and assets (mean 3.21). Both explanations are clearly of strategic nature, whereas the two least important factors, use of short-term debt to wait long-term rates to decline (2.37) and wait with long-term issuance until rating has improved (1.80), are more of speculative nature.
Seasoned equity offerings
We also asked the CFOs whether their company had seriously considered issuing common stock during the last two years. If yes, they were further asked to evaluate potential factors that typically affect company's decision to issue common stock. Ten different potential reasons were given and in case the respondents evaluated them on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). The results are provided in Table 6 .
Out of the 157 responses from the CFOs, thirteen did not answer this question. 54 (35.5%) of the companies had considered issuing common stock whereas 98 (64.5%) had not. This is almost similar to Graham and Harvey (2001) who found that 36% of their sample firms had seriously considered issuing equity. Earnings per share dilution and inability to obtain funds from other sources were found to be the most important contributing factors when considering the decision whether or not to issue common stock. Taxation and competitor's debt-to-equity rations were, on the other hand, found to be the least important contributing factors. Unlike in Graham and Harvey (2001) recent stock price increase or undervaluation were not rated as important reasons to issue equity.
Convertible debt
Finally, we asked the CFOs whether their company had seriously considered issuing convertible debt during the last two years. If yes, they were further asked to evaluate potential factors that typically affect company's decision to issue common stock. Eight different potential reasons were given and in case the respondents evaluated them on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). The results are provided in Table 7 . Out of the 154 responses from the CFOs, 32 (20.8%) gave an affirmative answer and 122 (79.2%) negative answer. About one fifth of the companies have seriously considered convertible debt. The results are again almost similar to what Graham and Harvey (2001) found. In their sample 20% of the firms had seriously considered issuing convertible debt.
In Panel B, we can see that the most important factor contributing to the choice of convertible debt is the (conceived) notation that it is cheaper than debt. The second most important reason is that convertible debt avoids short-term equity dilution (against the alternative of SEO). This finding is consistent with the Graham and Harvey (2001) finding convertibles are seen as an inexpensive way to issue delayed equity. Successful con-vertible issuances by other firms were not found important nor the aim to protect bondholders against managers and/or stockholders.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the results from a survey among all publicly listed Nordic firms on their policy decisions their capital structure. The results show that more than 60 percent of the companies have a relatively flexible debt target, whereas a strict target or no target at all is approximately equally common among the rest of the companies.
When studying the determinants of capital structure strictness, we find support for firm characteristics as well as variables of a behavioral nature. More profitable, and more levered firms are more likely to have a stricter capital structure policy. The latter finding is in contrast to findings in Graham and Harvey (2001) . This finding may be interpreted as examples of cases where there is pressure for the specification of either a min-TABLE 7. Convertible debt CFOs were first asked whether the company has seriously considered issuing convertible debt or issued in the last two years. If yes, they were asked to indicate the degree the importance of the given factors in their choice of issuing convertible debt. Answers were given on a 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) scale. Panel A reports the results for the first question. Panel B reports the results for the factors influencing the offering decision. N and Nempty are the total number of respondents with non-empty or empty reply, respectively. imum or a maximum equity-to-assets level from creditors or owners due to agency problems of free cash flow. We also find that the age of the respondent, the Chairman of the board, is significantly positively related to the strictness of the capital structure policy. This is in line with the "behavioral consistency theory" and the results of e.g. Cronqvist et al. (2012) , suggesting a match between the choices of the firm and the manager, conditional on older managers being more risk averse (Morin and Suarez (1983) ). We also find that a stricter debt target is more common in older firms.
We find support for a link between the strictness of the capital structure target and the firms' dividend policy. Stricter debt targets are more common among dividend paying firms, and firms whose respondents indicate that the firm has a definite dividend policy. These results support the joint setting of capital structure and dividend policies (as presented in Faulkender et al. (2012) ), and suggest that more research should be targeted to the joint analysis of these two.
In conclusion, regarding the overall capital structure policy, we find that CFOs emphasize the use of long-term debt over short-term mostly to minimize the risk of financial distress. Debt rating considerations play clearly a less important role in the companies. Many companies had considered seasoned equity offering (35.5%) or issuing convertible debt (20.8%). Earnings per share dilution and inability to obtain funds from other sources were found to be the most important contributing factors when considering the decision whether or not to issue common stock. Taxation and competitor's debt-to-equity rations were, on the other hand, found to be the least important contributing factors. On the other hand, the most important factor contributing to the choice of convertible debt is the conceived notion that it is cheaper than debt. The second most important reason is that convertible debt avoids short-term equity dilution -against the alternative of seasoned equity offering.
